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Abstract. In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an
extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. In such
a game each player has two types. Either the player is a rational player seeking to
minimize her own delay, or  with a certain probability  the player is malicious in
which case her only goal is to disturb the other players as much as possible.
We show that such games do in general not possess a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
in pure strategies (i.e. a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium). Moreover, given a game,
we show that it is NP-complete to decide whether it admits a pure Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. This result even holds when resource latency functions are linear, each
player is malicious with the same probability, and all strategy sets consist of singleton
sets of resources. For a slightly more restricted class of malicious Bayesian congestion
games, we provide easy checkable properties that are necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In the second part of the paper we study the impact of the malicious types on the
overall performance of the system (i.e. the social cost). To measure this impact, we
use the Price of Malice. We provide (tight) bounds on the Price of Malice for an
interesting class of malicious Bayesian congestion games. Moreover, we show that for
certain congestion games the advent of malicious types can also be beneficial to the
system in the sense that the social cost of the worst case equilibrium decreases. We
provide a tight bound on the maximum factor by which this happens.
1 Introduction
Motivation and Framework. Over the last decade, the study of strategic behavior in
distributed systems has improved our understanding of modern computer artifacts such as
the Internet. Normally, the users of such distributed systems are modeled as rational, util-
ity optimizing players. However, in many real world scenarios, users do not necessarily act
rational, but rather irrational. In this paper, we address one form of irrationality, namely,
we allow that players act in a malicious way. In this case, the only goal of a malicious
player is to disturb the (non-malicious) players as much as possible. The presence of De-
nial of Service attacks in the Internet is an example showing that such systems are quite
realistic. In many such systems with malicious players, the players have only incomplete
information about the set of malicious players. A standard approach for modeling games
with incomplete information uses the Harsanyi transformation [14], which converts a game
with incomplete information to a game where players have different types. The type of a
player represents its private information that is not common knowledge to all players. In
the resulting Bayesian game, each player's uncertainty about each other's type is described
by a probability distribution.
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2 Martin Gairing
One aspect of Game Theory that was studied extensively in recent years is the Price of
Anarchy as introduced by Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou [16]. The Price of Anarchy is the
worst case ratio between the value of the social cost in an equilibrium state of the system and
that of some social optimum. Usually, the equilibrium state is defined as Nash equilibrium
 a state in which no player can unilaterally improve her private objective function, also
coined as private cost. A Nash equilibrium is pure if all players choose a pure strategy and
mixed if players choose probability distributions over pure strategies.
While the celebrated result of Nash [20] guarantees the existence of a mixed Nash equi-
librium for ever finite game, pure Nash equilibria are not guaranteed to exists (see e.g.
[9,12,17,18]). An natural question to ask, is whether a given game possesses a pure Nash
equilibrium or not. We address this question by asking about the complexity of this decision
problem.
A class of games that always possess pure Nash equilibria is the class of congestion games
as introduced by Rosenthal [21]. Here, the strategy set of each player is a subset of the power
set of given resources, the latency on each resource is described by a latency function in the
number of players sharing this resource, and the private cost of each player is the sum of
the latencies of its chosen resources. Milchtaich [18] considered weighted congestion games
as an extension to congestion games in which the players have weights and thus different
influence on the latency of the resources.
To measure the influence of malicious behavior, Moscibroda et al. [19] introduced the
Price of Byzantine Anarchy as the worst case ratio between the social cost in an equilibrium
state of the system under some assumption on the malicious players and the social cost of
some social optimum without malicious players. They further define the Price of Malice as
the ratio between the Price of Byzantine Anarchy and the Price of Anarchy. We will use a
similar definition and define the equilibrium state as a Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Contribution. In this paper, we introduce malicious Bayesian congestion games as an
extension to congestion games where players might act in a malicious way. Following Har-
sanyi's transformation [14], we allow each player to be of two types. Either the player is
a rational player seeking to minimize her own delay, or  with a certain probability  the
player is malicious in which case her only goal is to disturb the other players as much as
possible. For such games we study the complexity of deciding whether a given game has a
pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Moreover, we study the impact of the malicious types on
the overall performance of the system (i.e. the social cost). To measure this impact, we use
the Price of Malice, which we define similarly as Moscibroda et al. [19].
We now describe our results in more detail. As our main result, we show that it is
NP-complete to decide whether a given malicious Bayesian congestion game admits a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This result even holds if resource latency functions are linear,
each player is malicious with the same probability, and all strategy sets consist singleton sets
(Theorem 1). The same result even holds if we further restrict to the case that each player
has at most four strategies and at most three players can be assigned to each resource
(Theorem 2). For symmetric Bayesian congestion games with identical type probability,
identical latency functions and strategy sets that consist only of singletons, we provide easy
checkable properties that are necessary and sufficient for the existence of a pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium (Theorem 3).
We then shift gears and present results related to the Price of Malice. For general mali-
cious Bayesian congestion games with linear latency functions, we show an upper bound on
the the Price of Byzantine Anarchy (Theorem 4). Moreover, we proof a lower bound on the
same ratio that already holds for the case of identical type probabilities (Theorem 5). As a
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corollary, we get an asymptotic tight bound on the Price of Malice (Corollary 2). We close
the paper with a tight lower bound on the maximum factor by which the social cost of a
worst case (Bayesian) Nash equilibrium of a congestion game might decrease by introducing
malicious types (Theorem 6).
Related Work. Congestion games and variants thereof have long been used to model non-
cooperative resource sharing among selfish players. Rosenthal [21] showed that congestion
games always possess pure Nash equilibria. The complexity of computing such a pure Nash
equilibrium has been settled for arbitrary latency functions by Fabrikant et al. [8] and
later for linear latency functions by Ackermann et al. [1]. On the other hand, for weighted
congestion games, Libman and Orda [17], Fotakis et al. [9] and Goemans et al. [12] provide
examples that do not allow for a pure Nash equilibrium. Dunkel and Schulz [7] showed that
it is NP-complete to decide the existence of a pure Nash equilibrium for a given weighted
congestion games.
The Price of Anarchy for weighted congestion games has been studied extensively (see e.g.
[3,2,5]). In case of linear latency functions, the Price of Anarchy is exactly 52 for unweighted
congestion games [5] and 1 + Φ for weighted congestion games [3], where Φ = 1+
√
5
2 is the
golden ratio. The exact value of the Price of Anarchy is also known for the case of polynomial
latency functions [2]. For bounds on the Price of Anarchy of (weighted) congestion games
with each strategy set being a singleton set of resources, we refer to [11] and references
therein.
Several recent papers considered games allowing for malicious player behavior [4,15,19].
Moscibroda et al. [19] introduced the Price of Malice and gave bounds on the Price of
Malice for a virus inoculation game where some of the players are malicious. In fact, our
definition of Price of Malice is motivated by the corresponding definition from this paper.
Karakostas et al. [15] and Babaioff et al. [4], study malicious player behavior in non-atomic
congestion games. Here, each player from a continuum of infinitely many players controls
only an infinitesimal small amount of weight and a fraction of those players is malicious. In
contrast to those papers, our games are atomic, and thus have only finitely many players.
This yields to different results.
For general Bayesian games, questions concerning the complexity of deciding the exis-
tence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium have been addressed in two recent works [6,13].
On the one hand, if the game is given in standard normal form, i.e. the utility functions and
the type probability distribution are represented extensively as tables, then deciding the ex-
istence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium is NP-complete [6]. On the other hand, if both
 the utility functions and the type probability distribution  are succinctly encoded, then
the problem becomes PP-complete [13]. In contrast to [6], malicious Bayesian congestion
games are succinctly represented but they are more structured as the games considered by
Gottlob et al. [13].
A certain class of Bayesian congestion game has been introduced in [10]. Here, players act
completely rational but they are uncertain about each others weight. Among other results,
the authors show that such games always possess pure Bayesian Nash equilibria if latency
functions are linear.
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2 Model
2.1 Congestion Games
Instance. A congestion game Γ is a tuple
Γ = (N , E, (Su)u∈N , (fe)e∈E) .
Here, N is the set of players and E is the finite set of resources. Throughout, we denote
n = |N | and r = |E| and assume n ≥ 2 and r ≥ 2. For every player u ∈ N , Su ⊆ 2E
is the strategy set of player u. Denote S = S1 × . . . × Sn. For every resource e ∈ E, the
latency function fe : N → R is a non-negative, non-decreasing function that describes the
latency on resource e. For most of our results, we consider affine latency functions with
non-negative coefficients, that is, for all resources e ∈ E, the latency function is of the form
fe(δ) = ae · δ + be with ae, be ≥ 0. Affine latency functions are linear if be = 0 for all e ∈ E.
A congestion game is called symmetric, if Su = S′u for any pair of players u, u
′.
Strategies and Strategy Profiles. A pure strategy for player u is some specific strategy
su ∈ Su, while a mixed strategy Qu = (q(u, su))su∈Su is a a probability distribution over Su,
where q(u, su) denotes the probability that player u chooses the pure strategy su.
A pure strategy profile is an n-tuple s = (s1, . . . , sn) whereas a mixed strategy profile
Q = (Q1, . . . , Qn) is represented by an n-tuple of mixed strategies. For a mixed strategy
profile Q, denote by
q(s) =
∏
u∈N
q(u, su)
the probability that the players choose the pure strategy profile s.
Load and Private Cost. For a pure strategy profile s, denote by δe(s) =
∑
u∈N :e∈su 1
the load on resource e ∈ [m], i.e. the number of players assigned to e. In the same way, for a
partial strategy profile s−i, denote δe(s−i) =
∑
u∈N ,u 6=i:e∈su 1 the load on resource e ∈ [m]
without player i.
Fix a pure strategy profile s. The private cost PCu(s) of player u ∈ N is defined by the
latency of the chosen resources. Thus
PCu(s) =
∑
e∈su
fe (δe(s)) .
For a mixed strategy profile Q, the private cost of player u ∈ N is
PCu(Q) =
∑
s∈S
q(s) · PCu(s) .
Social Cost. Associated with a congestion game Γ and a pure strategy profile s is the
social cost SC(Γ, s) as a measure of social welfare. In particular we use the expected average
latency. That is,
SC(Γ, s) =
1
n
∑
e∈E
δe(s) · fe(δe(s))
=
1
n
∑
s∈S
q(s)
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈su
fe(δe(s))
=
1
n
∑
u∈N
PCu(Q).
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Observe, that this measure differs from the total latency [22] only by the factor n.
The optimum associated with a congestion game Γ is the least possible social cost, over
all pure strategy profiles s ∈ S. Thus,
OPT(Γ ) = min
s∈S
SC(Γ, s) .
Nash Equilibria. Given a congestion game and an associated mixed strategy profile Q,
player u ∈ N is satisfied if the player cannot improve its private cost by unilaterally changing
its strategy. Otherwise, player u is unsatisfied. The mixed strategy profile Q is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if all players u ∈ N are satisfied, that is, PCu(Q) ≤ PCu(Q−u, su)
for all u ∈ N and su ∈ Su.
Depending on the type of strategy profile we differ between pure and mixed Nash equi-
libria.
Price of Anarchy. Let G be a class of congestion games. The Price of Anarchy, also called
coordination ratio and denoted by PoA, is the supremum, over all instances Γ ∈ G and Nash
equilibria Q, of the ratio SC(Γ,Q)
OPT(Γ ) . Thus,
PoA = sup
Γ∈G,Q
SC(Γ,Q)
OPT(Γ )
.
2.2 Malicious Bayesian Congestion Games
Instance. A malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ is an extension to congestion games,
where each player is malicious with a certain probability. Following Harsanyi's approach,
we model such a game with incomplete information as a Bayesian game, where each player
u ∈ N can be of two types: Either u is selfish or malicious. For each type of player u ∈ N
we introduce two independent type-agents us and um, denoting the selfish and malicious
type-agent of player u, respectively.
Let pu be the probability that player u ∈ N is malicious and call pu the type probability
of player u. Define the type probability vector p = (p1, . . . , pn) in the natural way. Denote
pmin = minu∈N pu. In the case of identical type probabilities pu = p for all player u ∈ N .
Define∆ =
∑
u∈N pu as the expected number of malicious players. Observe, that for identical
type probabilities∆ = p·n. Denote by ΓΨ the congestion game that arises from the malicious
Bayesian congestion game Ψ by setting pu = 0 for all player u ∈ N .
Summing up, a malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ is given by a tuple
Ψ = (N , E, (Su)u∈N , (pu)u∈N , (fe)e∈E) .
Strategies and Strategy Profiles. A pure strategy σu for player u ∈ N is now a tuple
σu = (σ(us), σ(um)) ∈ S2u, where σ(us) and σ(um) denote the strategy of the selfish type-
agent and malicious type-agent of player u, respectively. Denote σ = (σ1, . . . , σn). A mixed
strategy Qi is now a probability distribution over Si × Si. Define Q and q(σ) as before.
Private Cost. For any type probability vector p and pure strategy profile σ, denote the
expected selfish load on resource e ∈ E by δe(σ) =
∑
u∈N :e∈σ(us)(1 − pu) and the expected
malicious load by κe(σ) =
∑
u∈N :e∈σ(um) pu. For a partial assignment σ−u define δe(σ−u)
and κe(σ−u) accordingly, by disregarding player u.
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Fix any type probability vector p and pure strategy profile σ. The private cost PCu(p,σ)
of player u ∈ N is defined by
PCu(p,σ) =
∑
e∈σ(us)
fe (δe(σ−u) + κe(σ−u) + 1) .
In other words PCu(p,σ) is the expected latency that player u experiences if player u is
selfish. For each player u ∈ N , type-agent us aims to minimize PCu(p,σ). Observe, that
PCu(p,σ) does not depend on σ(um). For a mixed strategy profile Q, define PCu(p,Q)
accordingly.
Social Cost. Let Ψ be a malicious Bayesian congestion game with type probability vector
p and let Q be a pure strategy profile for Ψ . We generalize the definition of social cost
SC(Ψ,Q) to the weighted average latency of the selfish type-agents. That is,
SC(Ψ,Q) =
∑
u∈N (1− pu) · PCu(p,Q)
n−∆ .
Bayesian Nash equilibria. A selfish type-agent is satisfied if she cannot unilaterally de-
crease her private cost, that is, PCu(Q) ≤ PCu(Q−us , σ(us)) for all u ∈ N and σ(us) ∈ Su.
In contrast to the selfish type-agents, each malicious type-agent aims to maximize social
cost. So, a malicious type-agent is satisfied if she cannot increase social cost by unilaterally
changing her strategy.
For a malicious Bayesian congestion game, a mixed strategy profile Q is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium if and only if both type-agents of all players u ∈ N are satisfied. Depending on
the type of strategy profile we again differ between pure and mixed Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Price of Byzantine Anarchy and Price of Malice. For a fixed expected number of
malicious players ∆, let G(∆) be the class of malicious Bayesian congestion games where∑
u∈N pu = ∆. Similarly to [19], we define the Price of Byzantine Anarchy, denoted by PoB,
as the supremum, over all instances Ψ ∈ G(∆) and Bayesian Nash equilibria Q, of the ratio
between the social cost in Q and the optimum social cost of the corresponding congestion
game ΓΨ . Thus,
PoB(∆) = sup
Ψ∈G(∆),Q
SC(Ψ,Q)
OPT(ΓΨ )
.
Observe that for ∆ = 0, the Price of Byzantine Anarchy PoB(0) reduces to the Price of
Anarchy PoA as defined in Section 2.1.
Again similarly to [19], we define the Price of Malice by
PoM(∆) =
PoB(∆)
PoB(0)
.
3 Existence and Complexity of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria
In this section, we study the complexity of deciding whether a given malicious Bayesian
congestion game possesses a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium or not.
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Theorem 1. The problem of deciding whether a malicious Bayesian congestion game with
linear latency functions possesses a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium is NP-complete, even
if all strategy sets consist of singletons and either of the following properties holds:
(a) All players are malicious with the same probability p for any 0 < p < 1.
(b) Only one player is malicious with positive probability p for any 0 < p ≤ 1.
Proof. Our proof uses a reduction from a restricted version of 3-SAT. Here, 3-SAT is re-
stricted to instances where each clause is a disjunction of 2 or 3 variables and each variable
occurs at most three times. Tovey [23] showed that it is NP-complete to decide the satis-
fiability of such instances. Consider an arbitrary instance of 3-SAT with set of variables
X = {x1, . . . x`} and set of clauses C = {c1, . . . ck}. Without loss of generality, we may
assume that each variable occurs at most twice unnegated and at most twice negated.
ux1
ux2
ux`
e0x1
e1x1
e0x2
e1x2
e0x`
e1x`
e0
e4u2
u0
uc1
uc2
uck
1
β
M
u1
e2
e1
1
1
1
e3
Fig. 1. Construction for the proof of Theorem 1
Part (a): We will construct a malicious Bayesian congestion game with singleton strategy
sets and identical type probability p. Our construction imposes one player uc for each clause
c ∈ C, one player ux and two resources e0x, e1x for each variable x ∈ X, 3 additional players
u0, u1, u2, and 5 additional resources e0, e1, e2, e3, e4. Our construction is summarized in
Figure 1. Resources are depicted as squares and players as circles and an edge (solid or
dotted) between a resource e and a player u indicates that {e} is in u's strategy set. A
number α above a resource e defines the slope of the corresponding linear latency function
fe(δ) = α · δ. Denote Ev = {e0x1 , e1x1 , . . . , e0x` , e1x`}. For the proof of part (a), let β = 2 − p.
So, all resources e ∈ Ev share the latency function fe(δ) = (2− p) · δ.
Player u0 can only be assigned to e0. Both u0 and e0 are used to collect the malicious
type-agents of all players except player u1. Thus all those players have e0 in their strategy
set and M is chosen sufficiently large, such that for all those malicious type-agents e0 is a
dominant strategy and no selfish type other than us0 will ever prefer to choose e0. Choosing
M = `+1 suffices. Player u1 and u2 are connected to e1, e2, and e3, while u2 can also choose
e0 and e4. For each variable x ∈ X, the corresponding variable player ux is connected to
e0, e4, e
0
x and e
1
x. Assigning the selfish type-agent u
s
x to e
0
x (resp. e
1
x) will be interpreted as
setting x to true (resp. false). For each clause c ∈ C, the corresponding clause player uc is
connected to e0 and to all resources e
0
x (e
1
x) with x ∈ X and x appears negated (unnegated)
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in c. For the example in Figure 1, c1 = (x1∨x2∨x`), c2 = (x1∨x2), and ck = (x1∨x2∨x`).
Observe that by the structure of our 3-SAT instance, no more than two clause players are
connected to each resource in Ev. This finishes the construction of the malicious Bayesian
congestion game.
We will first show that if the 3-SAT instance is satisfiable then the corresponding
Bayesian congestion game possesses a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Given a satisfy-
ing truth assignment, we define a strategy profile σ of the malicious Bayesian congestion
game as follows:
 Both type-agents of player u0 can only be assigned to e0.
 All malicious type-agents except um1 are assigned to resource e0. By the choice of M ,
none of those malicious type-agents can improve.
 Both type-agents of player u1 are assigned to e1 and no type-agent of any player is
assigned to e2 or e3. It is easy to see that neither u
m
1 nor u
s
1 have an incentive to switch.
 Type agent us2 is the only type-agent assigned to e4. So, u
s
2 cannot improve.
 For each x ∈ X, the selfish type-agent usx of variable player ux is assigned to resource e0x
if x = true in the satisfying truth assignment, and to e1x otherwise. Each of these selfish
type-agents is the only type-agent assigned to her resource. So, they all experience an
expected latency of β = 2−p and changing to e4 would yield the same expected latency.
Thus, the selfish type-agents of all variable players are satisfied.
 Denote by E′v the subset of resources from Ev to which no selfish type-agent of a variable
player is assigned. Since we have a satisfying truth assignment, each clause player is
connected to some resource from E′v. For each c ∈ C , the selfish type-agent usc is
assigned to some resource in E′v as follows:
Consider the sub-game that consists only of the selfish type-agents of the clause players
uc, c ∈ C and the set of resources E′v. Observe that this sub-game is a (non-malicious)
congestion game and thus admits a pure Nash equilibrium [21]. Assign the selfish type-
agents of each clause player according to this Nash equilibrium. So, none of these selfish
type-agents can improve by changing to some other resource in E′v. Moreover, at most
two selfish type-agents are assigned to each resource in E′v and there is exactly one
selfish type-agent of a variable player assigned to each resource in Ev \ E′v. Thus, the
selfish type-agents of all clause players are satisfied.
Since no type-agent can improve be changing her strategy, it follows that σ in a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
For the other direction observe that any pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ fulfills the
following structural properties:
(I) All malicious type-agents except um1 are assigned to resource e0 and u
s
0 is the only selfish
type-agent assigned to e0.
(II) The selfish type-agent us2 is assigned to e4 and no other type-agent is assigned to e4.
Property (I) follows immediately by the choice of M . We will now prove property (II).
By way of contradiction assume that us2 is assigned to a resource in {e1, e2, e3} in a
pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ. In this case um1 will always choose the same resource as
us2. However, then there must be an empty resource in {e1, e2, e3} and us2 can improve by
choosing this empty resource. This contradicts our assumption that σ is a pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. Thus, us2 is assigned to e4. If some other type-agent is also assigned to e4,
then us2 experiences an expected latency of at least 2−p and us2 could decrease her expected
latency to 1 by switching to the empty resource in {e1, e2, e3}. Again a contradiction to σ
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being a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It follows that us2 is the only type-agent assigned
to e4 in σ. This completes the proof of property (II).
Since us2 is the only type-agent assigned to e4 it follows that for each variable x ∈ X the
corresponding selfish type-agent usx is either assigned to e
0
x or to e
1
x. If u
s
x is not the only
type-agent on that resource then her expected latency is at least (2− p)2 while changing to
e4 would improve her expected latency to 2− p, a contradiction to σ being a pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium. It follows that the selfish type-agents of all clause players are only assigned
to resources in Ev to which no selfish type-agent of a variable player is assigned. This is
only possible if the strategies of the selfish type-agents usx, x ∈ X correspond to a satisfying
truth assignment. This finishes the proof of part (a).
Part (b): To see that (b) holds we alter the construction depicted in Figure 1 slightly
by deleting player u0 and resource e0. Furthermore, in the new construction player u1 is
the only player that is malicious with positive probability p. For the slope of the latency
functions of resources in Ev, let β = 32 (in fact any 1 < β < 2 would also do). The rest of
the construction does not change. The proof now follows the same line of arguments as in
part (a) with only minor changes. uunionsq
Theorem 2. The results from Theorem 1 hold, even if |Su| ≤ 4 for all players u ∈ N and
for each resource e ∈ E there are at most three players u ∈ N with {e} ∈ Su.
Proof (Sketch). We will slightly alter the construction from Figure 1. First observe that we
have already |Su| ≤ 4 for all players u ∈ N . Furthermore, the only resources that are in the
strategy set of more than three players are e3 and for part (a) also e0.
e3,0
e3,x1
e3,x2
e3,x3
1
β
β2
u2
ux1
ux2
ux3
Fig. 2. Tree for ` = 3
To resolve this for e3, disconnect all players from e3 and replace the single resource e3
with a binary tree of resources with root e3,0 that has ` leaves e3,x1 , . . . e3,x` , all with depth
dlog(`)e. For a resource e at level j the latency function is defined by fe(δ) = βj · δ. So
fe3,0(δ) = 1 and fe3,x(δ) = β
dlog(`)e · δ for all leaves x ∈ X. For each pair of resources from
two consecutive levels, we introduce a new player to connect them. Call those players tree
players. Figure 2 shows the construction for ` = 3. Player u2 is connected to resource e3,0
and each variable player x ∈ X is connected to e3,x. We also change the latency function of
all resources e ∈ Ev (cf. Theorem 1) to fe(δ) = βdlog(`)e · δ.
Moreover, for part (a) we have to resolve that more than three players are connected to
e0. To do so, we simply copy resource e0 together with player u0 multiple times and connect
all players (including the tree players) except player u1 to the new set of resources that
evolve from e0. By having sufficiently many copies, this can be done, such that no more
than three players are connected to each new resource. Again,M is chosen sufficiently large,
e.g. M = 2dlog(`)e+1.
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Observe that us2 will only selfishly choose e3,0 if all tree players choose the strategy that
is closer to the leaves. The rest of the proof now simply follows the proof of Theorem 1. uunionsq
For the more restricted class of symmetric malicious Bayesian congestion game with
singleton strategy sets, identical type probability p and identical latency functions we can
easily decide whether a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists or not.
Theorem 3. A symmetric malicious Bayesian congestion game with singleton strategy sets,
identical type probability p and identical (not necessarily linear) latency functions possesses
a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium if and only if either of the following properties holds:
(a) p ≤ 12 and r = 2
(b) p ≤ 12 and r|n
Proof. Assume that at least one of the properties holds. We will show that in each case this
implies the existence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
First assume that (a) holds: For each player ui assign the selfish type-agent u
s
i alternately
to the two resources. At each time, we assign the corresponding malicious type-agent to the
other resource. It's not hard to see that the resulting strategy profile is a pure Bayesian
Nash equilibrium.
Now assume that (b) holds: In this case assign nr selfish type-agents and
n
r malicious
type-agents to each resource such that the selfish and malicious type-agent of each fixed
player are not assigned to the same resource. Again it is easy to see that the resulting
strategy profile is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
For the other direction we will show that if neither (a) nor (b) holds then the malicious
Bayesian congestion game does not possess a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. By way of
contradiction assume there exists a malicious Bayesian congestion game Γ satisfying neither
(a) nor (b) but Γ admits a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium σ. We consider 3 sub-cases:
Case 1: p > 12 and r = 2
By way of contradiction assume σ assigns more than dn2 e selfish type-agents to some resource
e. If this is the case then σ will also assign all malicious type-agents to e. But then all
the selfish type-agents on resource e can improve by switching to the other resource, a
contradiction to σ being a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. It follows that at most dn2 e
selfish type-agents are assigned to each resource. This again implies that dn2 e selfish type-
agents are assigned to one resource (say e1) and bn2 c selfish type-agents are assigned to the
other resource (say e2). Denote N1 = {u ∈ N|σ(us) = e1} the set of players with selfish
type-agent assigned to resource e1 and denote N2 = N \ N1. For each player u ∈ N2 we
have δe1(σ−u) > δe2(σ−u) which implies that σ(u
m) = e1 for all u ∈ N2. Will now show
that σ(um) = e2 for all u ∈ N1. If n is even then this holds immediately by symmetry. So
assume n is odd and ∃u ∈ N1 with σ(um) = e1. Now consider an arbitrary player u′ ∈ N1
with u′ 6= u. Since n is odd it follows that n ≥ 3 and thus such a player exits. Furthermore,
it follows that
⌊
n
2
⌋
=
⌈
n
2
⌉− 1. Then
δe1(σ−u′) + κe1(σ−u′) ≥ (1− p) · (
⌈n
2
⌉
− 1) + p · (
⌊n
2
⌋
+ 1)
=
⌈n
2
⌉
− 1 + p
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while
δe2(σ−u′) + κe2(σ−u′) ≤ (1− p) ·
⌊n
2
⌋
+ p · (
⌈n
2
⌉
− 2)
=
⌈n
2
⌉
− 1− p
< δe1(σ−u′) + κe1(σ−u′),
a contradiction to σ being a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. So, σ(um) = e2 for all u ∈ N1.
Summing up, for all u ∈ N1 we have σ(us) = e1 and σ(um) = e2 while for all u ∈ N2 we
have σ(us) = e2 and σ(um) = e1. In such an assignment each selfish type-agent on resource
e2 can improve be switching to e1. This contradicts our initial assumption that σ is a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Case 2: p > 12 and r|n
First assume by way of contradiction that there exists a resource e ∈ E to which σ assigns
more than nr selfish type-agents. It follows that there also exists some other resource e
′ to
which σ assigns less than nr selfish type-agents. Since σ is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium,
no malicious type-agent is assigned to e′. However, then all selfish type-agents on e improve
by switching to e′, a contradiction. It follows that σ assigns exactly nr selfish type-agents to
each resource. This also implies that σ(um) 6= σ(us) for all players u ∈ N .
If more than nr malicious type-agents are assigned to some resource e ∈ E then all selfish
type-agents on e can improve since p > 12 . So, σ assigns exactly
n
r malicious type-agents
to each resource. However, in such a pure strategy profile the selfish type-agent us of each
player u can improve by switching to σ(um). This contradicts our initial assumption that σ
is a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Case 3: r ≥ 3 and nr 6∈ N
First observe that if n < r and the malicious type-agents are satisfied then there is always
some resource e ∈ E to which no type-agent is assigned. Each selfish type-agent can then
improve by switching to e, a contradiction to σ being a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. So
we may assume that n > r.
Let E+ be the set of resources to which σ assigns at least
⌈
n
r
⌉
selfish type-agents. Since
n
r 6∈ N it follows that 1 ≤ |E+| ≤ r− 1. If |E+| ≥ 2 then σ assigns all malicious type-agents
to a resource in E+. This implies that there exists a selfish type-agents assigned to some
resource in E+ that can improve by switching to some resource in E \ E+. It follows that
|E+| = 1. Without loss of generality assume E+ = {e1}.
Since |E+| = 1 it follows that σ assigns exactly ⌊nr ⌋ = ⌈nr ⌉ − 1 selfish type-agents to
each resource e ∈ E \E+. Now, for all u ∈ N , if σ(us) ∈ E \E+ then σ(um) = e1. It follows
that σ assigns at least (r − 1) · ⌊nr ⌋ malicious type-agents to e1 and (by the pigeon hole
principle) there exists a resource e′ ∈ E \ E+ to which σ assigns at most
⌊dnr e
r−1
⌋
malicious
type-agents. Since r ≥ 3 and n > r it follows that all selfish type-agents on resource e1 can
improve by switching to resource e′. This contradicts our initial assumption that σ is a pure
Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In each case we got a contradiction to our assumption that σ is a pure Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, proving that Γ does not admit a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium. This finishes
the proof of the theorem. uunionsq
Observe, that the previous proof is constructive. So, if the requirements for the existence
of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium are fulfilled, then this equilibrium can also be easily
constructed in linear time.
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4 Price of Malice
We now shift gears and present our results that are related to the Price of Malice. We start
with a general upper bound on the Price of Byzantine Anarchy. The proof of this upper
bound uses a technique from [5] adapted to the model of malicious Bayesian congestion
games. Furthermore, it makes use of the following technical lemma, which has an easy
proof.
Lemma 1. For all x, y ∈ R and c > 0 we have x · y ≤ c · x2 + 14c · y2
Theorem 4. Consider the class of malicious Bayesian congestion games G(∆) with affine
latency functions. Then,
PoB(∆) ≤ n
n−∆ (1− pmin)
(
∆+
3 +
√
5 + 4∆
2
)
.
Proof. Let Ψ be an arbitrary malicious Bayesian congestion game from G(∆) and let ΓΨ be
the corresponding (non-malicious) congestion game. Let Q be an arbitrary Bayesian Nash
equilibrium for Ψ . Furthermore, let s∗ be an optimum pure strategy profile for ΓΨ . For each
player u ∈ N , we have
PCu(p,Q) =
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ) · PCu(p,σ)
≤ PCu(p, (Q−us , s∗u))
=
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ) · PCu(p, (σ−us , s∗u))
=
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈s∗u
fe(δe(σ−u) + κe(σ−u) + 1)
≤
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈s∗u
fe(δe(σ) +∆+ 1),
where the first inequality follows since Q is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium and the second
inequality holds, since κe(σ−u) ≤ κe(σ) ≤ ∆ for all e ∈ E. So, we get∑
u∈N
(1− pu) · PCu(p,Q) ≤
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈σ∗(u)
(1− pu) · fe(δe(σ) +∆+ 1)
≤
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
(1− pmin) · δe(s∗) · fe(δe(σ) +∆+ 1)
≤ (1− pmin) ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
δe(s∗) · fe(∆+ 1)
+ (1− pmin) ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
ae · δe(σ) · δe(s∗)
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Observe, that δe(s∗) ≥ 1 and thus δe(s∗) ≤ δe(s∗)2. Moreover, by applying Lemma 1 with
x = δe(σ) and y = δe(s∗), we get∑
u∈N
(1− pu) · PCu(p,Q)
≤ (1− pmin) · (∆+ 1) ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
δe(s∗) · fe(δe(s∗))
+ (1− pmin) · c ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
ae · δe(σ)2
+ (1− pmin) · 14c ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
ae · δe(s∗)2
≤ (1− pmin)(∆+ 1 + 14c )
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
δe(s∗) · fe(δe(s∗))
+ c ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
e∈E
δe(σ)fe(δe(σ))
= (1− pmin)(∆+ 1 + 14c ) ·
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈s∗u
fe(δe(s∗))
+ c ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈σ(us)
(1− pu) · fe(δe(σ))
≤ (1− pmin)(∆+ 1 + 14c ) ·
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈s∗u
fe(δe(s∗))
+ c ·
∑
σ∈S2
q(σ)
∑
u∈N
∑
e∈σ(us)
(1− pu) · fe(δe(σ−u) + 1)
≤ (1− pmin)(∆+ 1 + 14c ) ·
∑
u∈N
PCu(s∗)
+ c ·
∑
u∈N
(1− pu) · PCu(p,Q)
It follows that
SC(p,Q)
SC(s∗)
=
n
n−∆ ·
∑
u∈N (1− pu) · PCu(Q)∑
u∈N PCu(s∗)
≤ n
n−∆ (1− pmin)
∆+ 1 + 14c
1− c (1)
Now, choosing c = −1+
√
5+4∆
4(∆+1) yields
∆+ 1 + 14c
1− c =
∆+ 1 + ∆+1−1+√5+4∆
1− −1+
√
5+4∆
4(∆+1)
=
4(∆+ 1)2(1 + 1−1+√5+4∆ )
5 + 4∆−√5 + 4∆
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=
4(∆+ 1)2(1 + 1+
√
5+4∆
4+4∆ )
5 + 4∆−√5 + 4∆
=
(∆+ 1)(5 + 4∆+
√
5 + 4∆)
5 + 4∆−√5 + 4∆
=
(∆+ 1)(
√
5 + 4∆+ 1)√
5 + 4∆− 1
=
(∆+ 1)(
√
5 + 4∆+ 1)2
4 + 4∆
=
1
4
(4∆+ 6 + 2
√
5 + 4∆)
= ∆+
3 +
√
5 + 4∆
2
(2)
The theorem follows by combining (1) and (2) and since Q is an arbitrary Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. uunionsq
For the case of identical type probabilities we can provide a better upper bound on the
Price of Byzantine Anarchy. Observe that for identical type probabilities, ∆ = p · n and
pmin = p. As an immediate corollary to Theorem 4, we get:
Corollary 1. Consider the class of malicious Bayesian congestion games G(∆) with affine
latency functions and identical type probability p. Then,
PoB(∆) ≤ ∆+ 3 +
√
5 + 4∆
2
.
We proceed by introducing a malicious Bayesian congestion game that is parameterized
by a parameter α. In the remainder of the paper, we will make use of this construction
twice, each time with a different parameter α.
Example 1. Given some α > 0, construct a malicious Bayesian congestion game Γ (α) with
linear latency functions, n ≥ 3 players and identical type probability p and |E| = 2n as
follows: Let E = E1 ∪ E2 with E1 = {g1, . . . , gn} and E2 = {h1, . . . , hn}. Each player
u ∈ {1, . . . n} has three strategies in her strategy set. So, Su = {s1u, s2u, s3u} with s1u =
{gu, hu}, s2u = {gu+1, hu+1, hu+2} and s3u = E1 ∪ E2, where gj = gj−n and hj = hj−n for
j > n.
Each resource e ∈ E1 has a latency function fe(δ) = α ·δ whereas the resources e ∈ E2 share
the identity as their latency function, i.e. fe(δ) = δ.
The following theorem makes use of Example 1 to show the following lower bound on
the Price of Byzantine Anarchy.
Theorem 5. Consider the class of malicious Bayesian congestion games G(∆) with linear
latency functions and identical type probability p. Then ,
PoB(∆) ≥ ∆+ 2.
Proof. Consider the malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ = Ψ(α) given in Example 1 with
α = 1+(n−1)p1−p . Observe that ∆ = n · p.
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Obviously , the optimum allocation s∗ for the corresponding non-malicious game ΓΨ is
for each player u ∈ N to choose strategy s1u. This yields SC(ΓΨ , s∗) = 1 + α = 2+(n−2)p1−p .
On the other hand, if σ(um) = s3u and σ(u
s) = s2u for all player u ∈ N , then σ is a
(pure) Bayesian Nash equilibrium for Ψ , with
SC(Ψ,σ) = 2(1 + (1− p) + (n− 1)p) + (1 + (n− 1)p) · α
=
2(1− p)(2 + (n− 2)p) + (1 + (n− 1)p)2
1− p
It follows that
SC(Ψ,σ)
SC(ΓΨ , s∗)
= 2(1− p) + (1 + (n− 1)p)
2
2 + (n− 2)p
= 2(1− p) + 1 + (n− 1)p(2 + (n− 1)p)
2 + (n− 2)p
> 2− 3p+ n · p
= ∆+ 2− 3p.
The Theorem follows for p→ 0, which implies n→∞. uunionsq
Recall that the Price of Anarchy of (non-malicious) congestion games with affine latency
functions is 52 [5]. By combining this with Corollary 1 and Theorem 5 we get:
Corollary 2. Consider the class of malicious Bayesian congestion games G(∆) with affine
latency functions and identical type probability. Then,
PoM(∆) = Θ(∆).
For certain congestion games, introducing malicious types might also be beneficial to the
system, in the sense that the social cost of the worst case equilibrium (one that maximizes
social cost) decreases. To capture this, we define the Windfall of Malice. The term Windfall
of Malice is due to [4]. For a malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ , denote WoM(Ψ) as the
ratio between the worst case Nash equilibrium of the corresponding congestion game ΓΨ
and the worst case Bayesian Nash equilibrium of Ψ . We show,
Theorem 6. For each  > 0 there is a malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ with linear
latency functions and identical type probability, such that
WoM(Ψ) ≥ 5
2
− .
Proof. Consider the malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ = Ψ(α) given in Example 1 with
n = 3 and α = 1. This game (for n ≥ 3) was already used in [5] to proof a lower bound
on the Price of Anarchy for the corresponding non-malicious congestion games. For the
congestion game ΓΨ that corresponds to Ψ , all players u choosing s
2
u is a Nash equilibrium
s that maximizes social cost and SC(ΓΨ , s) = 5.
Now, consider the malicious Bayesian congestion game Ψ , where p > 0. First observe
that choosing s3u is always a strictly dominant strategy for the malicious type-agent u
m for
all u ∈ N . Moreover, us will never choose s3u. For i ∈ {2, 3}, let qi be the probability that usi
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chooses s1ui . Then u
s
i chooses s
2
ui with probability (1− qi). We will show that for all p > 0,
the selfish type-agent us1 experiences a strictly lower expected latency, if she chooses s
1
u1 and
not s2u1 .
On the one hand, if us1 chooses s
1
u1 then her expected latency is:
1 + 2p+ (1− q2 + 1− q3)(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h1
+1 + 2p+ (1− q2)(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g1
= 2 + 4p+ (1− p)(3− 2q2 − q3)
On the other hand, if us1 chooses s
2
u1 then her expected latency is:
1 + 2p+ (q2 + 1− q3)(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h3
+1 + 2p+ q3(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
g2
+1 + 2p+ (1− q2 + q3)(1− p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
h2
= 3 + 6p+ (1− p)(2 + q3).
However,
3 + 6p+ (1− p)(2 + q3)− (2 + 4p+ (1− p)(3− 2q2 − q3))
= 1 + 2p+ (1− p)(−1 + 2q2 + 2q3)
≥ 3p.
So us1 is always better of by choosing s
1
u1 .
By symmetry it follows that for each p > 0 there is a unique (pure) Bayesian Nash
equilibrium σ where σ(us) = s1u and σ(u
m) = s3u for all players u ∈ N . For its social cost
we get SC(Ψ,σ) = 2 + 4p.
So, for each  > 0 there is a sufficiently small p, such that
WoM(Ψ) =
SC(ΓΨ , s)
SC(Ψ,σ)
=
5
2 + 4p
≥ 5
2
− .
This finishes the proof of the theorem. uunionsq
This is actually a tight result, since for the considered class of malicious Bayesian games the
Windfall of Malice cannot be larger than the Price of Anarchy of the corresponding class of
congestion games which was shown to be 52 in [5].
5 Conclusion and Open Problems
In this paper, we have introduced and studied a new extension to congestion games, that
we call malicious Bayesian congestion games. More specifically, we have studied problems
concerned with the complexity of deciding the existence of pure Bayesian Nash equilibria.
Furthermore, we have presented results on the Price of Malice.
Although we were able to derive multiple interesting results, this work also gives rise to
many interesting open problems. We conclude this paper by stating those, that we consider
the most prominent ones.
 Our NP-completeness result in Theorem 1 holds even for linear latency functions, iden-
tical type probabilities, and if all strategy sets are singleton sets of resources. However,
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if such games are further restricted to symmetric games and identical linear latency
functions, then deciding the existence of a pure Bayesian Nash equilibrium becomes a
trivial task. We believe that this task can also be performed in polynomial time for
non-identical linear latency functions and symmetric strategy sets.
 Another, interesting problem in this perspective is to reduce the constants in Theorem 2
or show that this is not possible.
 Although the upper bound in Corollary 1 and the corresponding lower bound in The-
orem 5 are asymptotically tight, there is still potential to improve. We conjecture that
in this case PoB(∆) = ∆+O(1).
 We believe that the concept of malicious Bayesian games is very interesting and deserves
further study also in other scenarios. We hope, that our work will encourage others to
study such malicious Bayesian games.
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